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‘Fundamental British Values’: What’s fundamental? What’s value? And what’s (now) 
British?  
Ian Stronach, Liverpool Hope University.  Jo Frankham, Liverpool John Moores University 
(j.frankham@ljmu.ac.uk)  
‘It is not doubt but certainty that drives you mad’ (Nietzsche, on Hamlet, cited in Zizek 2015, 
p.90) 
‘We’re never suspicious enough of words..’ (Celine 2006, p256)   
 
Abstract 
We hope to give shallow answers to that first ‘deep’ question; to slight the question of 
‘value’ as mainly ‘interested commodities’, and to throw darkness rather than light on the 
now increasingly troubled question of ‘British’ identity.  Our approach is not to define 
‘fundamental British values’ (as we will show, that proved impossible) but to represent the 
multiplicity of contradictory contents that invest its form.  In such a ‘performative 
agonistics’ (Blyth, Chapman, Stronach, 2016; Toscano, 2016; Frankham and Tracy, 2012), we 
anticipate a dissemination rather than an insemination of meaning, in contrast with the 
ongoing neoliberal ‘rage for certainty’ (MacLure, 2005; Badiou, 2013).  ‘Fundamental British 
Values’ in Badiou’s terms, is a polysemous ‘event’, whose performances and contexts should 
be regarded within a series of theatrical metaphors – an ‘amphitheatre’ of meanings, 
perhaps, in a ‘post-truth’ world (Trapido, 2016: 57).  Thus these deconstructions should be 
seen as part of a more generic critique of neoliberal enclosures that seek for definitions, 
essences, identities and quantifications (Zuboff, 2019). 
 
Agon 1: There are a minimum of three questions to consider, as our title suggests. Each can 
be interrogated, as a critical departure. The ‘first’ conflict indicates how mere grammar can 
influence meaning through an unconsidered back door. The expression ‘fundamental british 
values’ comprises two adjectives and a noun. Therefore a minimum of three questions to 
consider, as our title suggests. Each can be interrogated as a critical excursion. ‘Fundamental 
British Values’, capitalised as such, offers a singularity, a ‘noun phrase’, a considerable 
reification: it offers a singularity. Three becomes One. The question ‘What are Fundamental 
British Values?’ becomes ‘What is Fundamental British Values?’ The notion, represented in 
this form, is a thing to be taught and learned. The form is the content, and the content is the 
form. 
‘Fundamental British Values’ is also reductive. The potentially critical becomes technical. 
Indeed, in some curriculum talk, the notion is referred to by its initials as FBV, an operative 
deployment that is part of a moral and educational curriculum which can be taken more or 
less for granted, like its curricular cousins, PSE, PHSE, etc. As such, it becomes a curricular 
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commodity that can be defined, assessed, and marked in the sense that migrants can pass 
or fail that status. Currently the threshold is policed by ‘Life in the UK Test: the essential 
study guide for the British citizenship test’ (2016, first published 2006). The cover boasts 
‘Over 500,000 copies sold’. Such a successful commodification of FBV is a ‘win-win’ situation 
for a government making a profit (test fee in 2019 is £50) from people who it may want to 
keep out. And the idea that ‘migrants’ might pay to be excluded from the UK must warm the 
coldest of Brexit hearts. 
What does agon 1 tell us about ‘fundamental British values’? One answer lies in the 
sequence ‘critical-technical-operative’. It expresses an increasingly definitive UK relation 
between policy, professionalism and practice whereby British teachers are operatives in a 
considerably deprofessionalised field. That is their ‘value’. They move from critique and 
pedagogy to ‘deliverology’ (Bower 2016: 368). Teachers are not even the vendors of FBVs. 
They are reduced to the status of couriers, (deliveroology?), mediating the transaction 
between the makers and retailers (the Government, assisted by the media) and the 
consumer/child/family household. 
Agon 2: In agon 1 we began to scratch the surfaces of ‘fundamental British values’ from a 
grammatical/ideological perspective. But what could the expression perform, as opposed to 
define? Here, we want to put the term into a number of discursive contexts, treating it 
somewhat in the manner of Zizek, as ‘.. inconsistent space traversed by a multitude of 
practices’ (2015: 27). Firstly, as Bower points out, political discourse in the UK (and 
elsewhere) has been reduced to a ‘discipline of vacuity’, mere sloganized injunctions. He 
draws on Blair, in particular: ‘the future not the past’, ‘the many not the few’ (one of 
Corbyn’s few debts to Blair), ‘Britain deserves better’, ‘secure borders, safe haven’ (2016: 
249). It’s fun to take apart that last slogan. It says ‘secure’ [in!] ‘borders’ [out!] ‘safe’ [in!]. In, 
out, shake it all about: this is political hokey- cokey. The content is risible, but again it is the 
form that performs in the populist theatre of educational politics. And the in/out of Brexit 
was a hell of a way for Boris & Co1 to end that particular dance. As Gary Younge concluded 
at the time: ‘The standard of our political discourse has fallen more precipitously than the 
pound and cannot be revived as easily’ (Guardian 2016, 30th June), although we doubt any 
easy revival of the pound. So, of course, we will have to get ‘fit for purpose’ and start 
‘punching above our weight’ while, of course, ‘going forward’ (Ledwidge 2012: 129; 
Thompson 2016 and Boltanski & Esquerre, 2016 provide many other examples). It should be 
noted that this hyper-simplification in the UK 2017 election back-fired – ‘the magical money 
tree’ versus ‘strong’ and ‘stable’ ‘leadership’ was perceived to be insultingly vague. 
According to Davies (2019: 9) such discourse offers ‘a new frontier in the marketization of 
politics’. Parry also notes the reduction to ‘tabloid-style slogans’ (2019:11), while Meek 
reflects on the ‘mythic simplification’ of such discourse, particularly  in relation to the 
‘dreamscape’ rhetorics surrounding Brexit (2018: n.p.). 
A second estrangement takes a different course. In analysing World Bank reports, Moratti & 
Pestre note ‘semantic transformations’, such as moves from the concrete to the abstract, 
from events to frameworks, industry to finance, and so on. They conclude there has been 
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over time a ‘bureaucratisation’ of the discourse that ‘self-organises around a few elements’ 
in such a way that World Bank Reports read as ‘strangely metaphysical documents’ (Moratti 
& Pestre 2013: 76, 88, 91). Freedland offers a similar but apparently unconnected account 
of the different registers deployed by Conservative and Labour publications around the 
2015 election. Labour also loves abstract nouns, like equality, fairness, aspiration, and 
opportunity, also reflected in Democrat-speak in the US. The Tories, in contrast, speak a 
much more vernacular narrative – mending the roof/mess left by Labour/ maxing out 
Britain’s credit/driving the car into the ditch/ balancing the books/living within our means 
(see also Stronach, Clark & Frankham 2014 on ‘metaphors of the meltdown’, where the 
global capitalist crisis is proleptically reduced (Thompson 2016: 6) to the tale of the 
Improvident Father in a strangely efficacious argument-by-Old-Testament-parable). 
Freedland regards this as Labour losing the ‘war of metaphor’, although we would rather 
call it a war of narratives, the one abstract and disembodied, the other a homely and family-
oriented story of recovery by ‘hard-working families’ as opposed to ‘benefit scroungers’. A 
leading Conservative, Iain Duncan Smith, called this ‘strivers’ versus ‘skivers’ - a poetic 
labour that must have left him exhausted. Freedland concludes that Labour must ‘learn to 
speak human’ (Freedland, Guardian, 2015, 18th July). There is an interesting paradox here: 
the American and French revolutions of the 18th century were full of powerful and polarised 
abstractions whose oppositions were historically productive (Arendt 1977). The retreat from 
abstract reasoning to bed-time stories reflects the infantilisation of political debate, via a 
highly strategic process. As ever, the form is much more sophisticated and performative 
than the banal content. 
These stultifying tendencies are reflected in both precautionary (e.g. ‘Prevent’) and 
celebratory (e.g. ‘British Weeks’) versions of FBV. The former looks suspiciously for signs of 
radicalisation in relation to Muslim youth in particular, but its warning symptoms seem to 
include a more universal teenage-hood – character changes, losing interest in previous 
activities, secretive behaviour. More specific danger signs include ‘[s]howing a mistrust of 
mainstream media reports’ and ‘[a]ppearing angry about government policies, especially 
foreign policy’ (Independent, 4th September, 2015, p4). (We refuse to state the obvious at 
this point.). Zuboff’s account of ‘surveillance capitalism’ is relevant (2019). 
The latter FBV tendency celebrates a Britishness as an all-encompassing way of life, as in 
one school’s fairly typical ‘British Week’ (an FBV-sponsored ritual, May 2015). Furthermore, 
much is signified in this vein by the setting in which the anthem is performed. In the 
aforementioned school’s British Week, the ‘climax was the children’s performance of “The 
National Anthem” – the children were dressed in red, white and blue for the occasion. Mrs 
Strickland said, “I was really pleased with the respectful way in which the children sang the 
National Anthem”.’ If we pause to examine this off-the-cuff remark, most striking is the 
passive tense notion that the children ‘were dressed’ in red, white and blue, as if the colours 
were imposed on them. They sing the anthem, and literally ‘flag’ their engagement.  
Agon 3: If thus far we have disrupted the FBV term itself and given it a contextual location 
as part of an impoverished political discourse, in agon 3 we can draw on the practices of 
Badiou (2005, 2013) and Zizek (2013, 2014, 2015) to deconstruct it further. 
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The most commonly invoked aspect of FBV (for brevity’s sake, and perhaps levity’s as well) 
is a cluster of concepts around the portmanteau notion of ‘freedom’ (democracy, equality, 
liberty, fairness etc). Zizek links that notion of ‘freedom’ to what he calls ‘wordless’ 
capitalism (Zizek 2015: 7). Such wordlessness represents, without Representation of course, 
the ‘Real of the global market’ (ibid.: 8). This ‘Real’ is a Lacanian notion, or as Badiou might 
put it, a manifestation of the ‘void of being’, an inevitable yet constitutive ontological lack 
(Badiou 2005: 327). With a satiric nod to Donald Rumsfeld (but not to the unacknowledged 
antiquary of the ‘Johari window’), Zizek suggests we focus on a neglected quadrant of 
Rumsfeld’s inventories of the ‘known’ and the ‘unknown’, the ‘unknown known’ (2014: 12). 
So we need to interrogate ‘fundamental british values’ both in terms of what they claim to 
be (surface 1, see later), what they suppress (surface 2), and what they nevertheless enable 
through that expression-suppression (surface 3). Surfaces 1 and 2 are intentional, but 
surface 3 is consequential, and somewhat unpredictable. 
Zizek opens his argument with the couplet Greek/Barbarian, pointing out that in this 
juxtaposition, all the differences of the world become the Other, a catch-all of discrepant 
identities that need to be fought rather than thought. Arendt comments, ‘.nationalist 
concepts of citizenship depend to a very large extent upon the presence of the common 
enemy from abroad’ (1977: 69; Arendt 2013). Zizek calls this ‘.. an empty container for all 
such unfitting elements’ (Zizek 2014: 34). It is easy to see how this Othering might translate 
into the couplet British/unBritish, and even easier to see how it might explain 
American/unAmerican. This is difference as war, a violent semantics of ‘us’ and ‘them’. So 
far, so obvious. 
Zizek then turns to the notion of ‘freedom’. Our empirical exploration of the FBV 
phenomenon yielded ‘free market’, ‘free choice, ‘free world’, and even ‘entrepreneurs – of 
– the – self’ (see also Zizek 2015: 59). This is the ‘dogmatic slumber of false freedom’ (ibid.: 
60), and Zizek offers a striking contemporary illustration: ‘Whistle-blowers […] render public 
the unfreedom that underlies the very situation in which we experience ourselves as free’ 
(ibid.: 59). Such governmentality, as Allen aptly puts it, reflects a reality where ‘government 
has finally learned to rule us through our freedoms’ (Allen 2014: 282). Britain was after all 
the test-tube of the ‘rule of freedom’ in its nineteenth century civic liberalism (Joyce 2003). 
But behind all such ‘freedoms’ and ‘flexibilities’ lies the ghost of Marx’s ‘reserve army of 
labour’, differently mobilised in the form of ‘zero-hours’ contracts and the like. British 
values are serviced, indeed, by the precariat, whose values do not include freedom, fairness, 
justice and equality. Agon 3 illustrates the slipperiness of the notion of ‘freedom’ as part of 
FBV. FBV is officially defined as comprising ‘democracy, personal liberty, rule of law, and 
tolerance and mutual respect’ (Home Office 2015: 2). Obama seems to agree, characterizing 
British values as ‘democracy, rule of law, open markets’, although it is interesting to see 
capitalism as overt and positive ‘value’ (Ash, Guardian, 29th April 2016).  
On the other hand Runciman is sceptical, arguing that financial values [implicit in ‘market 
capitalism’] are subject to ‘Gresham’s Law’ whereby ‘bad practices drive out good’: 
‘A gun-slinging ethos can all too easily spread in which greed is good, nice guys finish last, 
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and if you want loyalty go get yourself a cocker spaniel.’ (Runciman, 2016: 43) 
But BBC Radio 4 remained upbeat: British values aim to ‘uphold global democracy’ (4th 
December, 2015. 4.30pm). According to Arendt, such originary myths originate in an 
‘unmastered past’ (2013: 42), as for example, in Germany and in Israel. Devine offers 
examples from Scottish clans, including the ‘dreamscape’ of the Campbells tracing 
themselves back to King Arthur (2018). These notions of an ‘unmastered past’ express FBV 
as a reflection of a ‘zombie imperialism’ (Meek 2018, p. n.a.). 
Each of these ‘value’ couplets could be deconstructed in similar processes of scrutiny, 
looking in particular at ‘surface 3’ effects created by ‘..a vicious cycle of two poles 
generating and presupposing each other’ (Zizek 2015: 101), a consequential chaos. A final 
illustration of the oppositional couplet missing-in-action was supplied by then PM, David 
Cameron. He posited the centenary of the Battle of Jutland as a fine expression of British 
Values, ‘They fought in defence of British values’ (Press & Journal, 26th May, 2016). 
Cameron’s account is historically nonsense but structurally perfect sense. British 
values/extremism is the FBV couplet. It posits virtue against terror, friend against enemy, 
good against bad. Thus ‘Jutland’ can offer ‘value’ very well as an ‘interested commodity’ 
expressive of friend/enemy, democracy/tyranny and can even be hailed as a victory/defeat 
narrative (although the Germans inconveniently won that battle).  
It is significant that war should dominate metaphors hereabouts not least because ‘Jutland’ 
was about imperial domination. Its ‘British values’ concerned ‘empire’, with its inherent 
racism and exploitation, and rapacious global capitalism. Perhaps the choice of metaphor 
had its own Unconscious. After all, Negri defines ‘empire’ as ‘the ontological fabric in which 
all relations of power are woven together’ (2003: 18) and where ‘.. the whole of social life, 
production and reproduction and cooperation is subsumed by capital’ (ibid.: 13). ‘Jutland’ , 
then, can be seen as a confrontation of Capital by the capital ships of the British and 
German navies; a sort of FBV, all at sea. 
Finally, Slavoj Zizek offers this conclusion: ‘Reference to traditional values enables 
individuals to justify their ruthless engagement in market competition in ethical terms’ 
(2015: 170). Zuboff’s recent analysis of ‘surveillance capitalism’ (2019) would presumably 
concur. 
Agon 4 Here we turn from ‘values’ to their ‘Britishness’. It was the Romans who made the 
‘British’, through ‘enslavement’ according to Tacitus (1999: 17), certainly through 
colonisation. And it may well be the anti-Romans (cf: Treaty of Rome) that will unmake it. In 
addition, the Brexit call for Britain to regain its political sovereignty (‘we want our country 
back’, ‘the will of the people’ etc) may not stop at the UK. Scotland has returned to that 
issue with calls for a second referendum by 2021. Northern Ireland is also unhappy. Powell’s 
conclusion still stands: ‘ Paradoxically, it is the Little Englanders who will have brought about 
the end of the United Kingdom’ (Guardian, 30th June 2016). As Blair noted: ‘Euroscepticism 
is a form of British nationalism, mostly confined to the most ‘British’ island nation, the 
English.’ (cited in Bower 2016: 878). In which case, we can see invocations of ‘Fundamental 
British Values’ as an oblique and tiny epitaph of imploded ‘empire’.  
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An almost universal effect of that dynamic of past/present/future is a subordination of the 
‘present’ and the promotion of the Collective Individual  (Douglas 1980). The collectivity is 
reduced to an individual whose qualities define the nation or people, in what might be 
called a ‘manic tribalism’ (Mishra, Guardian, 25 July 2015). O’Toole sees this tribalism, with 
its determination to demonise ‘Europe’, as a ‘weird need to dream England into a state of 
awful oppression’ (2018: Guardian, 16 November: 11). 
This manic tribalism has different aspects. Partly it is the desire for national reclamation - 
wanting to get your country back (Farage, Trump, le Pen, Sturgeon, Putin). But national 
identity turns out to be an incoherence circling a perceived state of permanent loss, an 
enduring yet threatened presence as national essence, and a future promise that is never 
realised. Thus essence, lack and promise jostle in ‘heritage mania’ (Boltanski & Esquerre 
2016: 34; see Carter (2019 for an extended account), and in the proliferation of a ‘loose 
conglomeration’ (ibid.: 33; see also Hobsbawm & Ranger 1978) of spectacles, 
commemorations, public competitions – the burgeoning of ‘Poppy’ Commemorations being 
the latest example. 
The allusory Present summons the illusory Past. It seems that the less we are, the more we 
need to be. So, there is a ‘British’ claim to be fair, free and friendly down the ages from time 
immemorial, and yet at the same time a ‘Sleeping Beauty’ who has been dormant for a 
hundred years, but is now ready to re-awaken. The theme is well encapsulated as ‘a loss of 
some primordial unity and harmony which never existed, which is just a retroactive illusion’ 
(Davis 2015: 47; Zizek 2014:49-50; see also Nabulsi 2017).  
More prosaically, there are inventories of particular values that seem to itemise this 
identity. Thus official UK accounts of FBV portray ‘Britishness’ as expressing the Individual-
as-Citizen committed to ‘democracy, personal liberty, rule of law, and tolerance and mutual 
respect’ (2015: 2), although it may be significant that PM Theresa May in interview 
substituted ‘enterprise’ for ‘tolerance and mutual respect’ (Radio 4, 12 November, 2016). 
The Casey report trumpets the ‘British values of tolerance, inclusion and equality’ (Casey, 
Guardian, 5 December, 2016). 
As Fox points out, there is a futility in such inventories. Her anthropology of Englishness 
prefers to regard it as a dynamic, circling around notions of a competitive, arrogant ‘one-
downmanship’ and more centrally ‘dis-ease’ (Fox 2004: 557, 539). Alan Bennett would 
certainly see them as constitutive of a founding English hypocrisy, although he is either 
smart enough or English enough to personally plead guilty (‘What we do best is lip service’, 
Bennett 2016: 349). 
Nor have such invocations of national essence or identity ever been stable over time. As 
Shapiro points out Shakespeare had a Tudor identity that was clearly ‘English’ and 
celebratory (‘This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England’ (Shakespeare 1993: 388; 
Shapiro 2015: 206). And then came a Stuart sponsorship that emphasized Britishness rather 
than Englishness following the Union of the English and Scottish Crowns in 1603. Thus the 
Fool, in King Lear, is licensed to opine: ‘Then shall the realm of Albion/Come to great 
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confusion’ (Shapiro 2015: 34). But the conventional British originary myth reverses that with 
the component parts united (more or less) with the accession of James VI and Ist, when 
Shakespeare slyly rewrote ‘English’ history in British terms, including even ‘fee fi fo fum I 
smell the blood of a British man’ (Shakespeare 1993: 34, our emphasis). It is a current irony 
that James even proposed a new currency for his new ‘Great Britain’: it was to be called the 
‘Unite’. 
National identity, then, is a political contingent, a circumstantial artefact rather than an 
essence. Its various inventories are largely mythic and contradictory (Fox 2014; Bower 2016: 
885; Tombs 2015: 761; Ebbutt 1910). Blair’s list reflects the confusion of identities rather 
well: ‘both conformity and eccentricity, bluntness and reticence, deference and 
assertiveness, honesty and hypocrisy, community spirit and privacy’ (cited in Bower 2016: 
885). 
Agon 5 We turn now to look more specifically at ‘Britishness’ and its other national 
components. Our strategy here is not to promote essences of national identity, whether 
British, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish or English but to assert hybridity and fluidity: most 
nations, after all, are imperial bastards. 
The necessary ‘moral mythology’ (Fox 204: 555) of this new post-Tudor Great British unity 
was invested with metaphors of ‘marriage and fraternity’ (Shapiro 2015: 50). As James VI/I 
put it: ‘Had not God first united these two kingdoms both in language, religion and 
similitude of manners?’ (Shapiro 2015: 40). It is telling that the Conservative Party and the 
Union (in the face of calls for a united Ireland) is now propped up by the Democratic 
Unionist Party, whose British values, very different now to the ones that are mainstream on 
the British mainland, stake a reactionary conservative position in relation to gay marriage, 
abortion and women’s rights, not to mention creationism. It seems that some forms of 
religious extremism are ineligible for the ‘Prevent’ treatment. 
As we have seen, the more uncertain the essence of identity, the more certain the 
compulsion for icons and myth. As Meek notes, myth is ‘an instrument by which people 
simplify, rationalise, and retell social complexities’ (Meek 2016:3). Our approach here is to 
illustrate various constructions of national identity by looking at the ‘national’ branding of 
three iconic poets; Dylan Thomas (Wales), Hugh MacDiarmid (Scotland), and Seamus 
Heaney (Northern Ireland). Poets tend to ‘stand for’ the country with unusual intensity, 
especially when  they receive a national recognition. Think of England’s ‘Poet Laureate’, or 
Scotland’s ‘makar’, or the Welsh ‘bardd”. 
Davies’ account of Dylan Thomas notes that his parents, despite being Welsh-speakers, did 
not want him to speak Welsh. Nor did they want him to even sound Welsh, sending him for 
elocution lessons (Davies 2014).  And Thomas himself had ambivalence about Wales – ‘Land 
of my fathers/my fathers can keep it’. But Davies claims him as an ‘institutional Welshman’ 
(ibid.: 33), whose ‘creative strength depended on the very ground of Wales’(114). Thomas 
had a ‘national authenticity of style’ and a ‘bardic element’ (83) that resisted English 
nationalist kidnapping by the likes of Saunders Lewis’s: ‘He belongs to the English’ (1938, 
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cited p103). In this way, Davies burnishes a ‘right’ Dylan Thomas reminiscent of the Mr Right 
that Mae hankered after, in Under Milk Wood’. Mae, ‘raw as an onion’, was waiting for ‘Mr 
Right to leap up the burning tall hollow splashes like a brilliantined trout’ (Davies 2014:136; 
Thomas 1995: 340). Dylan Thomas emerges as Davies’s ‘brilliantined trout’, glistening in his 
Welshness. Our purpose here, though, is not to adjudicate Welshness, but to trace the 
insistency and contingency of its construction, as well as to note its uneasy relation to 
‘Britishness’ or ‘Englishness’. 
If Dylan Thomas was claimed for Wales, then it might be said that Hugh MacDiarmid claimed 
Scotland for himself. In his epic poem A drunk man looks at the thistle  MacDiarmid pulls 
together (but apart) a heterogeneous collection of cultural, linguistic, psychological and 
philosophical traits that he calls a ‘gallimaufry’ of Scottishness (MacDiarmid 1987, ed. 
Buthlay: li). Each register carries with it some version of polar opposites that characterise 
the contradictions of the culture, in a ‘jostling of contraries’ (xxiii). He sees Scotland 
peculiarly torn by Apollonian manifestations of form, rationality and restraint, as well as by 
Dionysian energy, life and idiosyncracy. Thus MacDiarmid invokes what he calls a 
‘Caledonian Antisyzygy’. MacDiarmid has no time for compromise in his ‘gallimaufry’ of past, 
present and  future Scottish identities. His hope, as Buthlay saw it, was that ‘through the 
violent destruction of traditional values, a new mystical vision would become feasible..’ 
(Buthlay 1987: xxxii). So the identity strategy is very different from Davies in respect to 
Dylan Thomas. Davies looked back in order to connect Dylan Thomas to Welsh traditions. 
MacDiarmid looks forward to a new ‘Caledonian’ future, sharing a Nietzschean scorn for the 
‘anti-education’ of the past (Nietzsche 2016): 
‘I’ll ha’e nae hauf-way  hoose, but aye be whaur/Extremes meet.’ (MacDiarmid: 14) [I’ll have 
no half-way house, but always be where/Extremes meet] 
Again, as with Dylan Thomas, we do not wish to subscribe to any particular version of 
Welshness or Scottishness, but rather to trace some of the disparate ways the various 
‘surfaces’ of identity and difference are mobilised. 
[Apologies to Heaney for raising the question of UK-ness or Britishness. Learning that his 
work was to appear in the Penguin Anthology of British Poetry, he famously asserted his 
Irishness: ‘Be advised my passport’s green. No glass of ours was ever raised to toast the 
Queen’ (Independent, 5.10.95)]. Nice one, Seamus! 
Conclusion 
‘Let there be Licht,’ said God, and there was.  A little’ (MacDiarmid op cit.:xxvii) 
Thus far, we have deconstructed ‘Traditional British Values’ as a grammatical /ideological 
term, located in a reflection of an impoverished political discourse, and as a political conceit 
concerning a range of values and virtues connected to ‘freedom’. FBV constructs are 
contradictory even where they are notof deliberate deceit. We argued that the term 
presented a series of ‘surfaces’ which obscured an underlying repression. Its ‘positive’ 
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surfaces suppressed a much darker history. The result (which we called ‘surface 3’) is a set 
of contradictions where positive expression and negative suppression encounter each other 
in an inevitable incoherence. Hence Blair’s antinomies are not so much foolish as they are 
true, especially perhaps as an inadvertent, personal confession. 
Earlier, we invoked the notion of this paper as an ‘evental space’, drawing on the work of 
Badiou and Zizek (Badiou 2013; Zizek 2014). It follows that our ambition is performative 
rather than descriptive, seeking to mobilise meaning in a number of different ways (Blyth et 
al 2016). The first of these is a de-singularized approach to ‘identity’. We have already cast 
doubt on national identity claims, whether British, German or whatever other manifestation 
of the ‘collective individual’. Even more so, however, we note that antagonistic definitions 
singularize in even more insistent ways – ‘the Taliban’, ‘al-Queda’, ‘boko haram’ and so on. 
Such a ‘surface 3’ expression/repression has consequences: ‘A sizeable percentage of 
Britain’s population now live without freedoms enjoyed by the majority. But the majority 
don’t see this. They only see an individual black, brown or Muslim Brit – alone, bearded, on 
the Tube, taking his seat on a plane, waiting for the bus with bulky shopping between his 
feet’ (Nabulsi 2017: 28). Nabulsi gives an example of extremist ‘othering’: ‘One despondent 
[Asian] man discussed the possible causes of his insomnia with his GP: “It makes me so 
angry what is happening in Iraq, and Syria, and it makes me so depressed.” Instead of 
treatment, he got a visit from the police’ (ibid.). 
Boltanski and Esquerre offer a key question which we might deploy to link nationalisms to 
globalisms:  ‘What is the link between de-industrialization, the increased demand for 
“exceptional” products, and the heritage mania?’ (2016: 34) 
First of all it is clear that populist politics in England & Wales has given voice to  classes 
made precarious by de-industrialisation and the emergent ‘gig economy’. Similar 
phenomena are clearly involved in the Trump election.  In both cases the problem was real, 
the solution illusory, investing Brexit with the ‘ghosts of industry and empire’ (Hazeldine 
2017: 53-4). What is now emerging is a political scenario which make moderate progressive 
journalism sound radical. Will Hutton of the Guardian (3.11.16) writes: ‘Britain faces its 
biggest peacetime crisis since 1945. Prolonged economic stagnation, perhaps depression 
seem inevitable. A liberal, tolerant, outward-looking country is being transmuted into an 
illiberal, intolerant, inward-looking one. A battle is being joined for our soul, yet many are 
strangely mute.’ If true in 2016, how much more so now? 
A sudden inversion of fundamental British values?  As Alan Bennett recently observed, you 
only have to stand still these days in order to move to the left. Bennett was also more 
sceptical about ‘British Values’. As we saw he took hypocrisy to be foremost. The 
distinguished journalist, Ascherson, would presumably agree: ‘Nothing in British history 
resembles this [Brexit] spectacle of men and women ramming through policies everyone 
knows they don’t believe in’ (‘England prepares to leave the world’ LRB, 17. 11.16).  
Ascherson reports Nigel Farage, ex-leader of UKIP, as declaring 23rd June 2016 as ‘England’s 
independence day’, a declaration that may become true in a manner he did not anticipate.  
[We note the characteristic elision of Britain/England.] 
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Finally, we leave FBV, in all its confusion, with one more observation. When peoples 
perceive external threats (Islamophobia, immigration, global competition etc) they invent 
‘magical’ cures so tiny as to be positively homeopathic (and with the same efficacy).  They 
do so as a universal relief from uncertainty. So what kind of mantra is FBV in the end? We 
are reminded of Che Guevara’s account of Congolese struggles where rebels believed that 
bullets could be turned into water by appropriate rituals. He called it ‘dawa’. (For a more 
general account, see Guevara 2001). Such belief was common in Southern and Central Africa 
(Mozambique, and South Africa in the Xhosa Risings of the 19th century). It helped insulate 
the local from more global fears. So FBV ends up as a homeopathic delusion, except in so far 
as it offers a gestural politics to politicians and policy-makers – ‘we are doing something 
about this.’ 
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